EVD History: From DVD Royalties to CBHD

Why China built EVD

By the early 2000s China was the world’s DVD player factory. Contemporary reports put 2002 production near 30 million units, with about 20 million exported and Chinese makers holding up to 70 percent of the global market. The industrial problem was royalties. Chinese sources put 6C pool fees at more than ten US dollars per domestic player and more than US$20 per export unit; Unitalen reprints US$13.8 domestic; English Wikipedia gives $13-$20 including CSS, Macrovision and MPEG-2. E-World later claimed China paid about US$1.2 billion a year in patent fees. Those figures disagree and are kept side by side. An E-World executive framed EVD’s purpose bluntly: so the next generation of disc players would not repeat the domestic DVD industry’s mistakes, and so China could steer its own HD direction.

1999: Beijing E-World

Research began in 1999. Chinese Wikipedia says Shinco, SVA and others jointly founded Beijing E-World Digital Technology. People’s Daily reported that the government contributed ¥10 million, about one quarter of R&D costs, and that the consortium charged ¥500,000 in licensing fees plus US$2 per player. Shareholder and alliance lists vary: E-World’s FAQ names Konka, Shinco, BBK, Amoi, Malata and SVA; English Wikipedia and c114 give longer nine-member sets. All are kept as open disagreements. Hao Jie (郝杰) led E-World and rejected the Super DVD label, pitching a modular information-appliance platform. Technical appraisal dates conflict: end of 2001 (c114, Zhang Baoquan, E-World FAQ) versus early 2002 (PjTime/ZOL reprints).

2003: On2, LSI Logic and the Great Hall launch

On2 Technologies signed EVD and non-EVD VP5/VP6 licences effective 21 June 2003 at US$2 per player with no per-disc royalty. LSI Logic announced itself as the first semiconductor supplier of high-definition EVD technology on its DoMiNo architecture. On 18 November 2003 EVD was unveiled at the Great Hall of the People. Eleven models from nine makers (Amoi, BBK, Changhong, Malata, Nintaus, Shinco, SVA, Skyworth, Yuxing) were named; players were to cost about ¥2,000; organisers hoped to attack DVD market share. Hao Jie projected up to 1.8 million players in 2004, three million in 2005 and nine million in 2006.

Same-week trade press already disagreed on the codec. EDN said EVD would use VP5 and VP6. EE Times said launch players employed MPEG-2 Main Profile @ High Level based encoding on LSI chips, with On2 an alternative option and AVS the long-term target. EE Times also noted from day one that DVD playback would still trigger DVD royalties. Both codec readings are kept.

2004: slow start

The Shinco EVD-8700 reached retail on 1 January 2004 at ¥1,998. For months it was effectively the only machine in stores; c114 recorded that only Shinco and SVA among the nine mainstream makers actually put EVD on the market. June 2004 brought a Dazhong EVD HD experience hall and a cut to ¥1,698; later promotions reached ¥998 with bundled discs. Players passed MII’s HD test in September 2004. Jindian Group and E-World formed Beijing Jindian Global with ¥200 million capital; the first release was fourteen titles. Rival red-laser camps launched the same year: Kaicheng’s HDV in January and Amlogic-backed HVD in April, with some brands sitting in two camps. Reported 2004 sales were about 200,000 players against Hao’s 1.8 million forecast. On2 filed LCIA arbitration on 3 May 2004 over unpaid fees and minimum royalties.

2005: SJ/T standard and arbitration

On 18 February 2005 SJ/T 11299-2005 was recorded as released and implemented; Chinese press dates the MII approval notice to 22 or 23 February. Western headlines called it a national standard; Chinese sources are more precise: it is an electronics-industry recommended (SJ/T) standard, not a GB national standard. Both wordings are kept. Sales ticked up briefly at chains such as Dazhong, but HD TVs still cost around ¥10,000 and discs remained scarce. Zhang Baoquan promised discs at ¥3-5; street prices stayed ¥18-28.

On 10 March 2005 the LCIA arbitrator dismissed On2’s claims. On2’s filings say minimum royalties were conditional on porting VP6 to two jointly selected DSPs, and that port was never completed. English Wikipedia instead says the claims failed primarily because few players were produced. Either way, VP6 never became the working codec of shipping EVD players. Later in 2005 E-World signed letters of intent for H.264 (STMicroelectronics), VMD multilayer discs (NME) and AVS-based next-generation EVD; none reached the market. Jindian Global announced AACS for new titles on 11 December 2005, fearing E-World’s licensed PC player would leak protection, while AACS itself was not yet final.

2006 crisis and Beijing Declaration

By late 2006 EE Times put roughly 700,000 EVD players in the market against about 20 million DVD players sold yearly in China. Li Hai of E-World had given 300,000-400,000 for 2005 sales; AFP later quoted Zhang with a conflicting 700,000 last year figure. Patent-pledge and Hao Jie rumours damaged confidence. HVD outsold EVD by as much as ten to one in some months. Suning refused to stock EVD as fake HD. Defections toward HD DVD began among alliance brands.

On 6 December 2006 the China EVD Industry Alliance issued the Beijing Declaration. Counts disagree: 18-20 makers and 51-54 players at about ¥700, framed as concentrating China’s red-laser industry against Japanese blue-laser standards, with 1080p discs promised by end of 2007. AP noted that an earlier promotion push had been dropped after 2004. Plans for Gome EVD stores and online outlets were announced; the commercial rebound did not materialise.

2007-2008 collapse and legacy

By August 2007 Nanfang Daily collected headlines that the alliance existed in name only and that sales were dismal. In 2008 Baidu records an HD-EVD rename with claimed 1080p output, ~¥1,000 players and ¥15-30 discs; no model numbers were found. English Wikipedia dates the last new hardware to 2008. Shinco, the EVD盟主, later moved to Tsinghua-backed CBHD. Around 2011-2012 Yicai reported Shinco under Changzhou government custody for restructuring, years after the first EVD.

Why it failed

  • No royalty escape: sellable players still played DVD, so 6C/3C fees remained (EE Times 2003 and 2006).
  • No content: roughly 14 titles in mid-2004 and about 100 by late 2006, mostly from one disc maker, against cheap pirate DVD compilations.
  • No visible benefit on ordinary TVs: HD sets were expensive; the EVD/DVD difference was hard to see on SD screens.
  • Divided domestic camp: EVD, HVD and HDV fought each other; some brands sat in two camps.
  • Internal conflict: On2 arbitration, E-World vs Jindian over PC playback and AACS, NME share-swap accusations, patent-pledge rumours.
  • Single chip source: only LSI Logic supplied EVD decoders (iSuppli via EE Times).
  • Blue laser arrived: HD DVD and Blu-ray launched in 2006; makers defected toward HD DVD and then CBHD.

Lineage to CBHD

EVD sits between CVD / Super VCD on CD and CBHD on blue-laser HD DVD-derived media: White Book VCD to CVD/SVCD (SJ/T 11196) to EVD (SJ/T 11299) to CBHD. EE Times already compared EVD to China’s earlier VCD-to-Super-VCD pattern. E-World itself said EVD subtitles inherited Super VCD research. English Wikipedia lists CBHD as a follow-on to EVD based on HD DVD technology. The optical jump from red-laser DVD to blue-laser CBHD closed the red-laser HD experiment that EVD embodied.

Market numbers in one place

Measure Figure Source note
2004 forecast Up to 1.8 million players Hao Jie, People’s Daily
2004 actual ~200,000 Li Hai to EE Times
2005 actual 300,000-400,000 Li Hai to EE Times
Installed base, Nov 2006 ~700,000 in the market EE Times
Conflicting 700,000 claim Sold “last year” (2005) AFP quoting Zhang; conflicts with Li Hai
China DVD market ~20 million players a year iSuppli via EE Times
Disc prices ¥18-28 typical; ¥3-5 promised (2005); ¥15-30 HD-EVD claim Kept as open disagreement with promise

Those sales envelopes are why the 2006 Beijing Declaration’s talk of replacing DVD by 2008 reads as industrial theatre in retrospect. The format had government notices, a chip vendor, a content company and retail experience halls. It never had enough titles, enough HD televisions in homes, or an escape from DVD royalties once players had to remain DVD-compatible to sell.

Sources

Further reading on historic video formats

If you want to learn more about historic video formats, get The History of Physical Video Formats from the Frontier by Stephen Driver on Amazon: